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ABSTRACT In themodern era of themobile apps (the era of surveillance capitalism - as termed by Shoshana
Zuboff) huge quantities of surveillance data about consumers and their activities offer a wave of opportunities
for economic and societal value creation. ln-app advertising - a multi-billion dollar industry, is an essential
part of the current digital ecosystem driven by free mobile applications, where the ecosystem entities
usually comprise consumer apps, their clients (consumers), ad-networks, and advertisers. Sensitive consumer
information is often being sold downstream in this ecosystem without the knowledge of consumers, and
in many cases to their annoyance. While this practice, in cases, may result in long-term benefits for the
consumers, it can result in serious information privacy breaches of very significant impact (e.g., breach of
genetic data) in the short term. The question we raise through this paper is: Is it economically feasible to trade
consumer personal information with their formal consent (permission) and in return provide them incentives
(monetary or otherwise)?. In view of (a) the behavioral assumption that humans are ‘compromising’
beings and have privacy preferences, (b) privacy as a good not having strict boundaries, and (c) the
practical inevitability of inappropriate data leakage by data holders downstream in the data-release supply-
chain, we propose a design of regulated efficient/bounded inefficient economic mechanisms for oligopoly
data trading markets using a novel preference function bidding approach on a simplified sellers-broker
market. Our methodology preserves the heterogeneous privacy preservation constraints (at a grouped
consumer, i.e., app, level) upto certain compromise levels, and at the same time satisfies information demand
(via the broker) of agencies (e.g., advertising organizations) that collect client data for the purpose of targeted
behavioral advertising.
INDEX TERMS Information privacy, preference, supply function economics, trading, market equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile applications (apps) are driving a major portion of the
modern digital society, including business small and large as
well as the state-of-the-art IoT/CPS systems. ln-app advertis-
ing is an essential part of this digital ecosystem of mostly free
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Alba Amato .
mobile applications, where the ecosystem entities comprise
the consumers, consumer apps, ad-networks, advertisers, and
retailers. As a popular example, Evite.com may sell lists
of their consumers attending a party in a given location to
advertisers via ad-networks run by Google and Facebook.
Similarly, the gene testing company 23andMemight sell their
clientele information directly to pharmaceutical companies
in order for the latter to develop medical drugs. As a social
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objective, a ‘win-win’ deal between (a) the commercial inter-
ests of entities (e.g., enterprises, apps, databoxes) that aggre-
gate and sell consumer data and those (e.g., ad-networks,
retailers) that buy this data from the latter, (b) interests of
consumer behavior targeting advertising firms, and (c) pre-
serving consumer side information privacy (IP). The basic
requirement for this ‘win-win’ ecosystem to exist in the
first place, is the flow of personalized information from the
consumer to the advertisers and retailers via the ad-networks
(or directly from consumer to the advertisers/retailers) for
effective/profitable ad placements, that subsequently moti-
vate the latter to collect personal data about consumers via
apps. The vision and benefits for such an ecosystem were
laid down by a certain school of information economists
way back from the 70’s (see more details in [1]), in favor
of having increased aggregate societal welfare. More specif-
ically, according to the survey, in return for personal data,
advertisers and marketers will benefit the consumer side
through monetary compensation (e.g., discounts, Facebook
Libre coins) and intangible benefits (e.g., personalization and
customization of information content), and price discrimina-
tion. Furthermore, the same school of information economists
state that the lack of use of personal data might lead to oppor-
tunity costs andmarket inefficiencies. To furthermore empha-
size the benefits of privacy trading, now from a consumer
viewpoint, a survey conducted by the authors in [2] advocate
consumers willing to trade data for incentives. In this paper,
we take the side of these economists to investigate privacy
outcomes in society as a result of such markets. However,
before we lay down research contributions with respect to
suchmarkets, we provide an explanation of why suchmarkets
are a need of the day despite privacy concerns raised due to
IP commercialization.
A. NEED FOR FAIR PRIVACY COMMERCIALIZATION
Most would agree that doing business with consumer data
without their consent is outright creepy. Consequently, as a
landmark regulatory corrective step to prevent commer-
cialization of personal data, the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) was initiated in May 2018 that impose
constraints, rights, obligations, and voluntary consumer
choice regarding personal data and its use. However, it is
questionable as to whether the psychological approach of
many apps—in offering a binary voluntary opt in/out, often
after presenting pages of legalese—results in user empower-
ment with respect to making the proper choice between gain-
ing utility from an app versus not using it. Indeed, we see that
individuals are increasingly using ad-blocking technology1
as a means to ‘push-back’, alongside deciding to gain utility
from apps. However, ad blocking firms like Eyeo, maker
of the popular AdBlock Plus product, has achieved such a
position of leverage that it gets Google et.al., to pay it to
have their ads whitelisted by default - under its self-styled
1https://pagefair.com/blog/2017/adblockreport/
‘acceptable ads’ program [3] - clearly going against the of
the core functionality principle of ad-blockers.
Thereby, with a significant likelihood, there might be an
inevitable breach of personal consumer information in gen-
eral to satisfy the economics behind the working of the current
ad ecosystem. According to a recent study [3] conducted
post GDPR enactment, influential popular app-firms like
New York Times (NYT) can likely make more revenues
from traditional advertising channels such as TV/newspapers,
compared to online/mobile advertising. However, this argu-
ment might not hold for moderate sized firms who con-
sequently would rely heavily on behavioral advertising for
generating revenues. The bottomline here is data interme-
diary entities will commercially gain from the consumer
data release downstream, whereas psychologically tricked
consumers, some of them being under the effect of the pri-
vacy paradox [4], voluntarily give up their personal data and
lose out on both privacy and monetary gains - an unfair
proposition. Moreover, one could argue here that paying for
apps2 would mitigate this issue, however, statistics prove that
consumers around the world are more keen on using free
apps compared to paid apps,3 and are also quite neutral to
the collection of cookies by third parties, during browsing
activities.4
On an orthogonal (to regulatory issues) note, Shoshana
Zuboff in her recent book [5] states with numerous real-life
surveillance examples of how since the early 2000’s (primar-
ily after 9/11), our daily life activities and ‘deepest secrets’
are all recorded, rendered as behavioral data, processed, anal-
ysed, bought, bundled, and resold like sub-prime mortgages
in a behavioral futures market, thanks to companies such
as Google and Facebook whose initial motivations for data
collection were rooted in boosting ROI for their investors.
And in seeking to survive commercially beyond their ini-
tial goals, these companies realised they were sitting on a
new kind of asset: our ‘behavioural surplus’, the totality of
information about our every thought, word and deed, which
could be traded for profit (via rejecting established norms
of societal responsibility and accountability) in new markets
based on predicting, shaping, and controlling our every need -
or producing it. The extraction of such information assets
by tech giants is so grotesque, so creepy, that it is almost
impossible to see how anyone who really thinks about it lives
with it - and yet we do. There is something about its opacity,
its insidiousness, that makes it hard to think about. Likewise
the benefits of faster search results and turn-by-turn directions
mask the deeper, destructive predations of what Shoshana
Zuboff terms ‘surveillance capitalism’, a force that is as
2There are quite a few services that already offer some level of
choice/configuration between full subscription (no ads, thus no third party
privacy exposure) and fully advertisement/analytics paid for (i.e. ‘‘free’’).
Consequently there’s the possibility of doing an empirical study to populate a
model of peoples’(not yet evident that they are privacy-rational) ‘‘willingness
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profoundly undemocratic as it is exploitative, yet remains
poorly understood - a central strategy of this regime. Despite
more and more people expressing their unease about the
surveillance economy, and seeking alternatives, it might be
long before we extricate ourselves from the toxic products
of both industrial and surveillance capitalism. Till then, one
workable solution might be to trade consumer data with their
consent in a fashion that benefits all fairly in the data release
ecosystem, and not just the data greedy firms. To this end,
the reader is referred to our recently published work, [6],
for additional details on the rationale behind privacy trading
being a solution jointly aligned with the supply and demand
sides of a privacy market.
B. TOWARDS ‘Preference-Based’ TRADING
A deeper look into existing research in the generic area of
designing privacy preserving economic mechanisms (cour-
tesy the survey paper in [7], though the paper is not in
line with the idea of privacy trading as applicable to this
work) reveals that the fundamental inability for any economic
mechanism dealing with consumer data to achieve a social
optimal state with respect to privacy (be it for data trad-
ing ecosystems or otherwise) lie in (i) the hardness to sat-
isfy strict heterogeneous consumer privacy preferences, and
(ii) the inability to internalize the negative externalities due to
privacy leakage, e.g., recent Facebook-Cambridge Analytica
data scandal [8]. Thus, as our main idea, a direction towards
optimizing social welfare, i.e., economic efficiency, is to
relax the strictness of privacy preserving preferences, thereby
allowing heterogeneous consumers to compromise their ideal
privacy requirements with their permission/consent in return
for benefits (e.g., monetary and non-monetary incentives).
These benefits contribute to resolving the issue in (ii).
The weight behind this novel idea of ours lies in the fact
that from a psychological perspective, most human beings
are acceptable to making varied levels of compromises in
real-life, especially for goods like privacy that have non-clear
boundaries [2] (See Section VIII for few examples where
privacy compromises are acceptable). Note that privacy com-
promises by consumers would result in apps selling more rel-
evant personalized information to ad-networks (and thereby
generatingmore revenue), the latter able to sell more ad-space
to advertisers at an increased revenue, and the advertisers
being able to target a broader personalized set of consumers.
Thus, we have a win-win situation among all ecosystem
entities. The big question then is: what is an optimal way to
compromise aggregate consumer privacy?
ResearchGoal - As a major goal, we aim to investigate via
a theory methodology, our radical idea of optimally compro-
mising aggregate consumer privacy, in a simplified market
ecosystem, through the combined use of micro-economic
theory and a composition property characteristic of the fam-
ily of information-theoretic privacy preserving technologies.
Here, the term ‘optimal’ is in the sense of achieving max-
imum utilitarian social welfare as an economic efficient
state. Through our efforts, we wish to provide introductory
foundational insights on designing information trading mar-
kets that improve social welfare, and pave the way for a more
general analysis of complex trading markets.
C. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
We make the following research contributions in this paper.
• We model a privacy trading ecosystem setting as a
supply-demand market consisting of (i) market com-
peting (both, in perfect and oligopolistic fashion) data
holders (DHs) representing app firms with locked-in
consumer base and (ii) a single ad-network acting as a
data broker between the app firms and the advertisers.
A salient feature of this trading ecosystem is the use
of data holder supply functions [9] - privacy preference
functions that map the amount of privacy compromise
(the ‘supply’) at an aggregate consumer level each data
holder is willing to make, i.e., the supply, for a given
‘‘benefit’’ it receives from the ad-network per unit of
data. The data holders submit their supply functions as
bids to an ad-network that then executes a uniform mar-
ket clearing ‘‘benefit’’ mechanism for all competing data
holders, to achieve optimal utilitarian privacy welfare at
market equilibria (see Section III).5
• We analyze perfectly competitive (in DHs) and
oligopolistic privacy trading markets based on our pro-
posed supply function model, for existence, uniqueness,
and economic efficiency of market equilibria. For per-
fectly competitive markets we show that they achieve
a maximum utilitarian social welfare state, i.e., an eco-
nomic efficient state, at a unique equilibrium. However,
for oligoplistic trading markets, we show that they reach
a unique market equilibrium that does not maximize
utilitarian privacy welfare in society (see Section IV).
• We mathematically characterize the efficiency loss for
oligopolistic trading markets by quantifying the differ-
ence between the unique market equilibrium obtained in
the competitive scenario with that in the oligopoly sce-
nario, via a Price of Anarchy (PoA) measure. As major
results, we find the following: (a) the set of data-holders
at oligopolistic Nash equilibrium (ONE) who compro-
mise on their privacy requirements at the aggregate
consumer level, is a superset of that at the perfectly
competitive equilibrium (PCE); (b) the market clearing
‘‘benefit’’ (per unit of compromise) at the ONE is higher
than that at the PCE, but the ratio of the two ‘‘benefits’’
is bounded; (c) the sum total of data holder disutility
(e.g., due to privacy compromise of their clients) at ONE
is larger than that at PCE, but the ratio is bounded by
certain mild assumptions; (d) if data holders have rela-
tively homogeneous cost functions (e.g., for trading data
types with similar privacy sensitivities), the differences
between the PCE and ONE tend to be very small - if the
5The readers are referred to the Section VIII (due to space constraints) for
a qualitative introduction on supply function economics and its relevance to
this work
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cost functions are extremely heterogeneous (for trading
data types with different privacy sensitivities), the quan-
tification of the differences can serve as rules of thumb
for the ad-network to limit the privacy compromising
power of DH firms to promote utilitarian social welfare.
For each of (a)-(d), we provide practical implications
pertaining to privacy and policy. (see Section V).
• We show in Section V that for the problem at hand, our
proposed supply functionmechanism for privacy trading
is optimal over a feasible family of mechanisms.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
In this section, we briefly review related literature most rel-
evant to privacy trading markets. We identified two strands
of research in this context: one rooted in the economics
literature, and the other rooted in the technical litera-
ture on privacy-aware mechanism design. With respect to
privacy-preserving metrics of operation, applicable only to
the technical literature, we note that the metric proposed
in this work is assumed to fall in the same general fam-
ily of metrics used in existing works, i.e., the family of
information-theoretic privacy (IP) metrics (see [10]) where
resulting data is encapsulated with generated statistical noise
to preserve IP, and IP guarantees are additive (e.g., as in
differential privacy (DP)).
The vision and benefits for information (privacy) trading
(not necessarily consensual) had their roots in arguments
made in the 1970s by University of Chicago economists,
Posner [11], [12] and Stigler [13], in favor of having
increased social welfare. In later years, their arguments were
upvoted by information economists such as Laudon [14] and
Acquisiti et al. [1] Varian [15], Odlyzko [16], Schwarz [17],
and Samuelson [18]. The primary thesis of these schol-
ars being that the lack of use of personal client data will
lead to opportunity costs and market inefficiencies (sub-
optimal states of economic social welfare) since it conceals
potentially relevant information from other economic agents
(e.g., the downstream data intermediary entities in Figure 1)
that eventually hamper the profitability of these agents. As a
modern day example, client data (obtained via apps) on
fitness, health habits, cyber-hygiene can benefit (cyber) insur-
ance service agencies to target and allocate well-matched
policies to their clients - conversely the lack of quality
data can lead to bad matches and erode profit margins.
In contrast to the Chicago-school views, a number of
economists including Hirshleifer [19], [20], Burke et al. [21],
Wagman [22], Daughety and Reinganum [23], and
Spence [24] are of the opinion that the costs to the demand
side of the market to acquire quality client information in
a non-consensual setting may outweigh its social benefit,
thereby decreasing social welfare. It is here that consensual
information trading with benefits to the supply side could
reduce the costs to acquire supply side information and
improve social welfare. In this work, we adopt the Chicago
school of thought and assume that sellers will be consensual
with the buyer demands in return for monetary remuneration.
FIGURE 1. Market Architecture with a Single Data Broker (Ad-Network).
We assume consensual information trading to be regulated
in the interest of social welfare, and an appropriate step for
determining the effectiveness of trading in data intermedi-
ary settings such as in Figure 1. According to Varian [15],
Odlyzko [16], andAcquisiti et al. [1], consumer data obtained
(with or without consent) can have negative effects on society
simply because post transaction the consumers have little
knowledge or control over how and by whom their personal
data will later be used. The firm (e.g., ad-networks) may sell
the consumer’s data to third parties (e.g., advertisers), which
may lead to spam and adverse price discrimination, among
other concerns, and subsequently lead to consensual con-
sumers opting out of trade in future. Regulation here can curb
the adverse effects of these negative externalities arising from
trading and significantly contribute to welfare efficient and
complete markets (where supply equals demand) [25], [26].
Examples of practical ways to implement regulations sug-
gested in existing literature include legislative property rights
on consumer personal data shared between the supply and
demand side [14], technical metrics (e.g., DP) being adopted
by demand side data intermediaries (e.g., ad-networks) to
check on the degree of IP breach [6], and frameworks such as
those developed in [27]–[30] to improve security and privacy
for BigData systems (e.g., HDFS).
Specifically, in relation to the data intermediary settings
such as in Figure 1, De Corni‘ere and Nijs [31] rule out,
for regulated consensual trading settings, direct price dis-
crimination by the demand side on the supply side based
on consumers’ personal information by focusing instead on
advertising firms’ bidding strategies in auctions for more
precise targeting of their advertisements. That is, given that
consumers’ private information provides a finer and finer
segmentation of the population, firms can compete to adver-
tise their non-discriminatory pricing over each of those con-
sumer segments. Hence, by disclosing information about
consumers, the ecosystem ensures that consumers will see
the most relevant advertisements, whereas when no informa-
tion is disclosed under a complete privacy regime, ads are
VOLUME 8, 2020 146009
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displayed randomly. This is in contrast to our model that
vouches for price-discrimination - the reason being in our set-
ting, unlike the above-mentioned works, there is a statistical
perturbation of the consumer private data sold downstream
with noise for privacy considerations. Hence a finer clear
segmentation is not possible. De Corni et.al. also state that
targeted advertising in the presence of private non-perturbed
consumer information can lead to higher prices, and, in line
with Levin and Milgrom [32], Bergemann and Bonatti [33],
and Cowan [34] that improving match quality by disclos-
ing consumer information to firms might be too costly to
an intermediary - because of the informational rent that is
passed on to selling firms. This is again in contrast to our
findings - simply because in our model the selling data might
be perturbed downstream by statistical noise.
Most existing works on privacy-aware mechanism
design [35], [36] [37], [38] [39], [40], [41] assume that there
is a trusted data holder of unperturbed consumer data. The
private data is either already kept by the data holder, noise per-
turbed by it, or is evoked using mechanisms that are designed
with the aim of truthfulness. What the data holder purchases
is the ‘‘right’’ of using individuals’ data in an announced way.
A major direction in which our work differs from existing
work is in considering that data holders are not trusted by
consumers to keep their data private, may not noise perturb
it to appropriate levels while releasing it to agencies like ad-
networks, in return for benefits. To this end, in the seminal
work by [35], individuals’ data is already known to the data
collector (the data collector here analogous to an ad-network
in our work), and individuals (analogous to the data holder
in our work) bid their costs of privacy loss caused by data
usage, where each individual’s privacy cost is modeled as a
linear function of ε if his data is used in an ε-differentially
private manner. The goal of the mechanism design here is to
evoke truthful bids of individual cost functions. In contrast,
our setting is more realistic and assume that (a) DH cost
functions are private information - not for release to an ad-
network, and (b) cost functions need not be linear but convex.
Subsequent works [36], [37] [38], [40] explore various
models for individuals’ (analogous to DHs in our work)
valuation of privacy, especially the correlation between the
cost functions and the private bits. This line of work has been
extended to the scenario that the data is not available yet and
needs to be reported by the individuals to the data collector,
but the data collector is still trusted [39], [42] [41], [43] -
whereas we assume that the data collector (the ad-network
in our case) is purposely selling consumer data (obtained
via DHs) to advertisers for monetary gains. For more details
on the interplay between differential privacy and mechanism
design, [7] gives a comprehensive survey. In [44], the authors
envisage a market model for private data analytics such that
private data is treated as a commodity and traded in the
market. In particular, the data collector (the ad-network in
our case) uses a game-theoretic incentive mechanism to pay
(or reward) individuals (DHs in our work) for reporting infor-
mative data, and individuals control their own data privacy
by reporting noisy data with the appropriate level of privacy
protection (or level of noise added) being strategically chosen
to maximize their payoffs. However, unlike us, they assume
that utility parameters of individuals are not private informa-
tion, which may not be true in practice. In addition none of
the above-mentioned works deal with the case of managing
heterogeneous privacy guarantees across individuals (DHs
in this work), as we do. Very recently, the authors in [45]
address the heterogeneous privacy guarantee case. However,
to address information asymmetry on the seller side, their
solution is restricted to the design of a two-seller, single
buyer contract based on a binary distribution of seller privacy
attitudes. In contrast, our solution is general and addresses the
multi-seller, single buyer setting, where seller preferences are
captured using supply functions.
In a very recent research effort, similar to our
motivation, the authors in [46] design a privacy trading
mechanism for commercializing location privacy in mobile
crowdsensing applications. More specifically, they propose
an auction-theoretic framework between workers and the
platform to trade location privacy data, given a differential
privacy induced leakage budget. However, though they are
similar in nature to our work in proportionalizing benefits
with privacy leakage (and showing budget-balanced, truthful,
and incentive compatibility properties of auction mecha-
nisms), there are some significant differences between the
contributions made in [46] and this work: (i) we formally
model market competition between established app firms
serving a base of consumers; in contrast, the players (work-
ers) in [46] are mobile end users distributed in a geographical
locality thereby only interacting with the platform through
an auction, and not traditionally competing in an oligopoly
market - hence such a market analysis is missing from their
work, (ii) unlike us, the work in [46] neither characterize
market efficiency gaps in theory, nor do they prove the
optimality of their mechanism over feasible families of eco-
nomic variables (e.g., cost functions, mechanism classes,
etc.), and (iii) as an obvious distinction, our application
space, i.e., a supply-chain framework of mobile apps leaking
data upstream to ad-networks and advertisers, is different in
geographical scope from that of mobile crowdsensing.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we propose the salient features of our param-
eterized static market model representing a privacy trading
ecosystem that is built atop the seminal economic theory of
supply function bidding proposed by Klemperer in [9]. Due
to space constraints, we refer the reader to a qualitative back-
ground (see [6]) of supply function theory by Klemperer and
Meyer as being an appropriate regulated economic method
that forms the primary basis in the design of markets to trade
group privacy6 - the privacy of a group of app clients, rather
6Shoshana Zuboff in her recent book, The Age of Surveillance
Capitalism [5], states that it is group privacy that is most important to
surveillance capitalists as the individual user is just a pawn and not the
product - the product is group data.
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than individual clients themselves. Table 1 can be referred to
for a set of important notations used in the paper.
TABLE 1. Table of Important Notations.
A. MARKET ELEMENTS
Our market elements (see Figure 1) comprise of consumers
locked in with their respective data holders (DHs) and an
ad-network acting as a data broker between the data holders
and a body of advertisers (ADV). We assume the presence of
regulatory bodies (e.g., governments) whose goal is to ensure
a certain level of social welfare state (e.g., maximum amount)
keeping in mind the privacy interests of people in society.
We assume that consumers are locked-in with their respec-
tive data holders in a given time period. Examples of data
holders include ad-publishing mobile apps, social media
apps, IoT databox apps,7 etc. Data holders compete with
each other - as an example, competing mobile apps with
similar functionalities (e.g., UberEats, GrubHub) are mar-
ket competitors. Similarly, IoT databoxes manufactured by
competing firms, each having their consumer base, compete
with each other in the market. A consumer can simulta-
neously be client to multiple DHs. Based on pre-ordained
policies, the data holders collect consumer data relevant to
their functionality, and upon the consent of the consumers
(e.g., Android and iOS phones have their own but differ-
ent policies on how consumers can control data release to
apps running on the phones). However, despite providing
control to consumers, unwanted but voluntary data release
by the latter is possible via methods designed through the
proper use of psychology, behavioral economics, and neu-
roscience. Ad-networks (e.g., Google Ad Network, Bing Ads
by Microsoft) act as mediators between DHs and advertis-
ers, where the latter’s goal is to post advertisements with
DHs in order to enable targeting, tracking, and reporting
of consumer impressions. Finally, to cite an example of the
structure of data that could be traded by the DHs having
access to aggregate consumer data from their client base -
parts of it that is assumed to be private, a database is one
7a given customer base can be associated with multiple competing app
or social media DHs; however, in this work we assume a one-one mapping
between consumers and DHs for relative tractable simplicity, as this setting
itself is challenging enough. We leave the analysis of the one-many setting
for future work.
of the possibilities. As popular practical examples, the firm
BookYourData (BYD) offers upstream buyers ready-made
lists of contacts of business individuals across different indus-
tries, job titles, job functions, and job levels. A record in a
list consists of contact information such as name, email, job
function, department, country etc.
B. MARKET STRUCTURE
We consider two traditional market structures: perfect com-
petition, and oligopoly, to be operative amongst the DHs.
In each structure, the competing DHs trade privacy compro-
mise amounts with a single ad-network8 using a supply func-
tion bidding9 approach (see Section III.C). The ad-network in
return provides some ‘‘benefits’’ (to be explained later in this
section) to the DHs based on the amount of compromisemade
by the DHs. The ADV generates a demand10 for consumer
information to the ad-network, and in pay the ad-network to
match them with appropriate DHs so as to enable targeting,
tracking, and reporting of consumer impressions.
C. MODEL FOR SUPPLY FUNCTION BIDDING
In this section we formally introduce the mechanism between
competing DHs and the ad-network. A diagrammatic illustra-
tion of the process as shown in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2. Illustrating Privacy Preference Function Trading with One
Broker.
Setup - Consider a set N of |N | DHs that are locked-in
with their respective consumer base. In the ideal state, each
DH needs to obey certain privacy requirements derived from
the privacy preferences of their consumer base. To preserve
generality, we assume that the privacy requirements of each
DH map to a privacy metric that is an element of the set of
information gain metrics [10] that measure the amount of
information an adversary can gain. Note that the differential
8Since different ad-networks run their own supply function mechanisms
for privacy trading independently of the others, the analysis of one extends
to the others. Thus, each app will trade on different parameters with different
ad-networks at market equilibrium (see Figure 3). Hence, in a somewhat sim-
plistic sense, it is enough to analyse a single ad-network scenario. Moreover,
when it comes to the number of major ad-networks, recent studies [3] report
that they are primarily owned by Google and Facebook.
9Supply side privacy preferences, as functions of incentives, derived via
survey Q&A, deviates us from the use of the standard Bertrand and Cournot
trading mechanisms that have one-dimensional (price or quantity) strategy
spaces.
10This is usually done through a bidding process like Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) auction (not the explicit focus of this work) between
the ADVs and the ad-network, based on consumer data that interests
relevant ADVs.
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privacy metric is just one element of this set. Higher the
value of the privacy metric, the less information an adversary
can gain. However, given the presence of the ad-network
and ADVs, there are two main reasons why there may not
be the simultaneous satisfaction of privacy requirements of
each DH : (i) keeping in mind the ‘‘benefit’’ making mindset
of DHs (the ‘‘benefit’’ whose source are the ADVs), achiev-
ing the optimal cost-benefit tradeoff with the ad-network
might not guarantee strict privacy-preservation for DHs,
(ii) it is known, via results from [7], that designing mech-
anisms that ensure heterogeneous privacy preservation at a
utilitarian social welfare optimal state is an open problem.
The Process - Each DH i ∈ N is willing to consensually
compromise qi(bi, pi) amounts of aggregate client privacy
(measured through the privacy metric - as shown in Figure 2,
usually either DP, KL-divergence, Mutual Information, etc.)
with the ad-network, in return for a per-unit of compromise
benefit value, pi, i.e., qi is a parameterized function of pi and
a non-negative bidding parameter bi. As an example, let qi to
be a linear function of the form:
qi(bi, pi) = bipi, i ∈ N , (1)
The compromise function, qi, for each DH i is their param-
eterized supply function. The benefit to each DH, pi from
the ad-network is primarily monetary in nature. Examples of
benefits to the consumer base (derived from pi11) include
the amount of price reduction over the market price paid by
individual consumers locked-in with a given DH12 (for the
case of paid apps), or in the case DHs are free to consumers
- an amount of reduction in the number of advertisements
displayed on the DH at a time instant (e.g., in case of an app)
for each consumer to improve their usability experience.
We emphasize here that each DH i only submits the
function qi to the ad-network, as a signal of its preference
on privacy compromise, without revealing its private util-
ity/payoff function (see Section IV) of which qi is just a part.
Subsequently, the ad-network just has the values of qi’s at its
disposal to arrive at a market uniform market clearing value
of per-unit benefit that maximizes social welfare amongst
the DHs13
We assume that the total privacy compromise demand for
the ad-network coming upstream from the advertisers end
needs to meet a specific amount d > 0 (for a general






bip = d, (2)
11DHs make up for the discounts through benefits from the ad-network.
12The consumer market prices charged by competing DHs might vary for
each DH.
13One could argue that the popular Kelly’s mechanism would also suffice
to obtain social welfare optimality, but the latter mechanism is suitable only
for one-dimensional bids, and not necessarily functions.
14In the special case when the privacy metric under consideration is
differential privacy, the total compromise demand d is analogous to the







Note here that Equation (2) holds due to the composabil-
ity property of certain privacy metrics such as differential
privacy [47], [48]. b = (b1, . . . ., bN ) is the supply function
profile of the DHs. In the event when
∑
i bi = 0, the ad-
network will reject the bid.
IV. MARKETS ANALYSES
In this section, we analyze perfectly competitive and
oligopolistic market structures of DH competition in the
backdrop of a single ad-network. The strategy space for the
DHs is the set of feasible parameter values for their supply
functions. We assume no restrictions on DH compromise
amounts and select the linear supply function as the preferred
choice for the DHs. To this end, we first provide a strong
rationale on our choice of supply function. We then proceed
with the markets analyses.
Why Use a Linear Supply Function? - We answer this
question by first stating that, unlike us, the seminal work
in [9] does use a general function as the bidding strategy
for the purpose of analysis. However, if our bidding action
were to change from the linear form (represented by the
single variable, bi in our work) to a general form like in [9],
the analysis of the strategic behavior of the DHs become
muchmore complicated. To drive home this point, solving the
general supply function equilibrium (SFE) (introduced in [9])
requires solving a set of differential equations. To the best of
our knowledge, there are only existence results about the SFE
while assuming the agents (DHs in our work) are symmetric
(i.e., with the same cost function) or assuming there are only
two asymmetric agents - these assumptions are not practical
in reality. For practical applications, the asymmetric case is
more interesting. On the positive side, the greatest advantage
of using linear supply function over the general forms is the
ability to handle asymmetric DHs when there are more than
two DHs. Moreover, as we will show later in this section,
(a) the linear supply function allows us to get a closed form
characterization for the structure and efficiency of the market
equilibria, which could be impossible to get if using the gen-
eral supply function, and (b) in the case of oligopoly markets,
linear supply function induced markets minimize worst case
efficiency loss for non-restricted compromise markets. Thus,
we lose no generality in working with linear supply functions
as they would be incentive compatible for rational DHs to use
(see Section V).
A. PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS
In perfectly competitive markets, DHs are ‘benefit taking’.
Such markets arise when there are a plethora of DHs sell-
ing similar basic consumer information (e.g., users’ prefer-
ences towards the items or products, language preference,
time zone) that are mostly not very personal - so a stan-
dard common benefit value ensues. Given a benefit p, each
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DH i maximizes its net revenue given as:
max
bi≥0
pqi(bi, p)− Ci(qi(bi, p)) (4)
where the first term is the revenue of DH i when it compro-
mises qi(bi, p) amount of privacy at a benefit p per unit of
compromise with a bidding parameter of bi, and the second
term is the total cost incurred to make the compromise. This
cost can be interpreted as the sum of (a) the cost of mak-
ing technical adjustments required to compromise privacy
(e.g., technological/software costs of hosting ads by advertis-
ers), (b) costs of handling consumer complaints/unpopularity,
(c) brand/app switching with respect to degradation of quality
of experience (QoE) arising from clients experiencing delay
and high cellular bandwidth costs in loading apps.
Definition 1: A perfectly competitive equilibrium (PCE)
for the privacy compromise system is defined as a tuple
{(b̄i)i∈N , p̄} such that p̄i is optimal in (4) for each DH i given
the benefit p̄ and
∑
i qi(b̄i, p̄) = d.
The following result shows the existence and uniqueness
of PCE, and it also shows the efficiency of the latter in maxi-
mizing utilitarian social welfare. The proof of the theorem is
in the Section VIII.
Theorem 1: The PCE, {(b̄i)i∈N , p̄}, for the privacy com-
promise system exists and is efficient, i.e., (q̄i)i∈N =
(qi(b̄i, p̄i))i∈N maximizes the utilitarian social welfare





i qi = d. If the cost function
Ci(qi) is strictly convex, the PCE is unique.
Theorem Implications - The theorem implies that there
exists a pure (and unique, if DH cost functions are strictly
convex) strategy PCE vector of DH privacy compromise
amounts for all DHs at a particular homogeneous PCE benefit
p̄ set by the ad-network that meets the aggregate ad-network
demand of d units of total privacy compromise, and maxi-
mizes utilitarian social welfare amongst the DHs. In a nut-
shell, the theorem states that at market equilibrium efficient
privacy trading is possible amongst heterogeneous DHs and
an ad-network.
Based on the above theorem, we can further study how the
compromise cost function affects a DH’s privacy compromise
amount at PCE. For each DH i, we define the base privacy
compromise marginal cost as C0i = C
′
i (0
+). Without loss of
generality, we assume that C01 ≤ C
0
2 ≤ . . . . . . . ≤ C
0
|N |. For
modeling convenience, we also introduce parameter C0
|N |+1





. . . . . . . ≤ C0
|N | ≤ C
0
|N |+1. We have the following result on
the privacy compromise characteristics of individual DHs,
the proof of which is in the Section VIII.
Theorem 2: Let {(b̄i)i∈N , p̄} be a PCE and q̄i = qi(b̄i, p̄)
be the corresponding privacy compromise amount by DH i.
The set of DHs that embrace positive compromise amounts,
i.e., {i : q̄i > 0}, at the PCE is given by the set









Moreover, benefit p̄ at the PCE satisfies
Cn̄0 ≤ p̄ ≤ C
0
n̄+1, (6)
for any i ∈ N̄ , p̄ = C ′i (q̄i).
Theorem Implications - The theorem states that the PCE
has a waterfilling structure - the base privacy compromise
cost C ′i (0) determines whether DH i compromises privacy or
not. The higher the marginal cost at zero, the less likely the
DHs will join the privacy compromise program, i.e., embrace
a positive amount of compromise. Moreover, the DHs who
join the privacy program at PCE bear the same marginal cost.
The theorem also implies individual rationality is guaranteed
at PCE, i.e., each DH in the privacy compromise program
makes non-negative net revenue - we state this as the follow-
ing corollary, the proof of which is in the Section VIII.
Corollary 1: AnyDHwho participated in the privacy com-
promise program receives non-negative net revenue at PCE,
i.e., p̄q̄i − C ′i (q̄i) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N̄ .
Market ‘Win-Win’ for Ecosystem Stakeholders - An
efficient privacy trading market implies that (a) DHs are led
to optimal tradeoffs on how much to compromise aggregate
client privacy versus the per-unit compromise (monetary)
benefit they get from the ad-network, (b) the ad-network
satisfies the downstream demand from the advertisers on
their informational requirement, (c) advertisers, through the
ad-network can get get their ads placed to the right audience,
and (d) consumers, via themonetary benefits received byDHs
from the ad-network, either get to pay less for their services,
or view fewer ads to improve the QoE. They also see useful
targeted ads.
B. OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKETS
In oligopolistic competition markets, DHs are ‘benefit antic-
ipating’, i.e., the DHs know that the benefit p is set according
to (3) and behave strategically. Such markets arise when there
are a few DHs in the market strategically competing with
one another on specific types of consumer information that
might be sensitive to the latter (e.g., location, device ID,
genetic information). We denote the supply function for all
DHs but i as b−i = (b1, b2, . . . ., bi−1, bi+1, . . . .., b|N |)
and write (bi, b−i) for the supply function profile b.
Each DH i chooses bi to maximize its own benefit ui(bi, b−i)
given others’ bidding strategy b−i















Here, the second equality is obtained by substituting the
market clearing benefit p(b) = d∑
i bi
and the linear supply
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bidding function qi(p(b), bi) = bip(b) into the first equality.
As a result functions {ui(bi, b−i)i∈N define a privacy compro-
mise game.
Definition 2: A supply function profile b∗ is an oligopolis-
tic Nash equilibrium (ONE) if for all DHs i ∈ N, we have
ui(b∗i , b
∗
−i) ≥ ui(bi, b
∗
−i), ∀bi ≥ 0.
In order to derive results regarding the existence and
uniqueness characteristics of Nash equilibria in oligopoly
markets, we first propose the following three lemmas (for
investigating the existence and uniqueness of ONE), which
are proved in the Section VIII.





j > 0 for any i ∈ N.
Lemma 1 also directly implies the following lemma, which
we state without proof.
Lemma 2: If b∗ is an ONE of the privacy compromise
game, then at least two DHs have b∗i > 0.
Lemma 3: If b∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the privacy com-






j for any i ∈ N, and
each DH will compromise an amount less than d2 at the ONE,
and no ONE exists when |N | = 2.
The proof of Lemma 3 is in Section VIII. We now turn to
state the first of the two main results in this section.
Theorem 3: Assume that |N | ≥ 3. The privacy compromise




i Di(qi) subject to
∑














Theorem Implications - The theorem implies that there
exists a pure and unique ONE strategy vector of DH privacy
compromise amounts for all DHs at a particular homoge-
neous ONE benefit p∗ set by the ad-network that meets the
aggregate ad-network demand of d units of total privacy
compromise, but does not provide a guarantee on maximizing
utilitarian social welfare amongst the DHs (see Section V
in the paper for a mathematical explanation). In a nutshell,
the theorem states that at an oligopolistic privacy trading
market between heterogeneous DHs and an ad-network leads
to an equilibrium state that is not economically efficient.
From the proof of the theorem in the Section VIII, it can
be seen as reverse-engineering from ONE to a global opti-
mization problem. Define 1Ci(qi) =
qi




Ci(xi)dxi. Then Di(qi) = Ci(qi) +1Ci(qi). Thus,
1Ci(qi) can be interpreted as ‘‘false information’’ reported
by the DHs to gain more benefit from privacy compro-
mise by the ad-network, through strategic bidding. Note that
1iCi(qi) > 0 for all qi ∈ [0, d2 ). 1iCi(qi) being greater than
zero implies that all DHs fake a higher cost function in order
to increase the benefit.
Not the Best ‘Win-Win’ for Ecosystem Stakeholders - A
‘no-guarantee’ on the efficiency of privacy trading oligopoly
implies that DHs might not be able to strategize in a manner
so as to converge upon optimal compromise-benefit tradeoffs,
but the existence of a unique market equilibrium suggests
stable strategizing by the former, i.e., a win-win state that
is not the best one. This means that the DHs will fake high
costs of compromise to get more benefits that will transfer
more incentives to the consumer side at ONE,when compared
to PCE. However on the flip side, the privacy compromise
amounts at ONE will be higher (not something the DHs
would prefer) based on the true compromise costs of the
DHs. From a privacy perspective, this result is fairly intu-
itive as various price strategic mobile apps sell data that are
correlated among the apps, and this correlation negatively
affects privacy preservation guarantees at the ad-exchange.
The ad-network and the advertisers are able to satisfy their
objectives, as in the PCE.
Based on Theorem 3, similar to the case of perfectly com-
petitive markets, we can further study how a cost function
affects a DH’s privacy compromise amount at ONE. For each
DH i, we define the base privacy compromise marginal cost
as C0i = C
′
i (0
+). Without loss of generality, we assume that
C01 ≤ C
0
2 ≤ . . . . . . . ≤ C
0





+). For modeling convenience, we also introduce param-
eter C0




3 ). Thus, we have
C01 ≤ C
0
2 ≤ . . . . . . . ≤ C
0
|N | ≤ C
0
|N |+1. We now have the
second important result (see Section VIII for a proof) for this
section, on privacy compromise characteristics of DHs.







be the ONE benefit, and q∗i = b
∗
i p
∗ be the corresponding
privacy compromise amount by DH i. The set of DHs i that
embrace positive compromise amounts, i.e., {i : q∗i > 0},
at the ONE is given by the set N ∗ = {1, 2, . . . . . . , n∗}, with













for any i ∈ N ∗, p∗ = D′i(q
∗
i ).
Theorem Implications - The theorem states that the ONE
has a waterfilling structure, and henceforth the implications
are exactly the same as for Theorem 2. The theorem also
implies individual rationality is guaranteed at ONE, i.e., each
DH in the privacy compromise program makes non-negative
net revenue - we state this as the following corollary, the proof
of which is in the Section VIII.
Corollary 2: AnyDHwho participated in the privacy com-
promise program receives non-negative net revenue at ONE,




i ) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N
∗.
V. EFFICIENCY AND OPTIMALITY ASPECTS
In this section, we characterize efficiency loss of oligopoly
privacy trading markets and derive the optimality of our
mechanism choice.
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A. CHARACTERIZING EFFICIENCY LOSS AT ONE
We have shown that utilitarian social welfare is maximized at
PCE, thereby making perfectly competitive markets efficient.
In contrast, due to DHs’ benefit-anticipating and strategic
behavior, the ONE is expected to be less efficient. In this
section, we investigate the efficiency loss at ONE for differ-
ent degrees of heterogeneity among DH cost functions, and
provide closed form characterization of the efficiency loss
(if any). Here, we define the the efficiency loss as the ratio
of the total disutility at PCE to the minimum total disutility,
i.e., the ratio C
∗
C . Thus, efficiency loss is equivalently the price
of anarchy (PoA) [49]. To this end, we have the following
main result post investigation.
Theorem 5: Let {(b̄i)i∈N , p̄} be a perfectly competitive
equilibrium (PCE), and p∗ be the corresponding benefit at the
oligopolistic Nash equilibrium (ONE).We have the following:
1) N̄ ⊆ N ∗ where N̄ is the set of DHs who participate in
the privacy compromise program at PCE, and N ∗ is the
set of DHs who participate in the privacy compromise
program at ONE.
2) p̄ ≤ p∗ ≤ n − 1n −
2M





m = mini∈N C ′i (
d
n ).













i ) is the total social cost at ONE.
Theorem Implications - The conditions in the theorem
together imply the following:
• The set of DHs that contribute to the privacy compro-
mise program at ONE is a superset (due to more DHs
seeing an opportunity tomake benefits by bidding strate-
gically) of that at PCE (due to the non-strategic nature
of the DHs at PCE).
• The benefit at the ONE is higher than that at PCE (due
to strategic DH behavior at ONE), but the ratio between
the two benefits are bounded. This last point makes sure
that there are limits of DHs to exploiting the advantage
of strategic behavior over non-strategic behavior.
• The total (aggregate) compromise cost at the ONE
is higher than that at the PCE (due to strategic
higher bidding, consequently more benefits, conse-
quently unwanted additional privacy compromise), but
the ratio between the two costs are bounded (incentiviz-
ing strategic higher bidding over non strategic bidding),
provided no one compromises more than half of the total
demand at the PCE (can be enforced via regulation).
• In addition, as long as no DH compromises more than
d
3 at PCE, the efficiency loss
C∗
C is bounded by
3
2 . This
condition can be guaranteed if there are at least three
DHs having comparably low compromise cost (e.g., big
firms with a huge base of locked-in clients and/or firms
trading non-sensitive data), compared to the others.
The presence of closed form expressions for the effi-
ciency loss may serve as a guideline to regulators for
limiting the market power of someDHs (in the oligopoly
setting) to maximize social welfare (e.g., by allowing the
entry of new moderate/big DH app firms in the market
to stiffen competition, and/or control types of data to be
traded).
Moreover, from Theorems 2 and 4, we can derive the fol-
lowing special case result if the DHs have homogeneous
costs, and the difference between the two market equilibria,
i.e., PCE and ONE, are small. The proof of the result is in
the Section VIII.
Corollary 3: On the condition that DHs have the same cost
function, we have the following: 1. p∗ = n− 1n − 2p̄. As n→
∞, p∗→ p̄. 2. C∗ = C̄. As n→∞, C∗→ C̄.
The condition guarantees that when app firms fac-
ing similar cost structure (due to trading similar data
type) are in competition, applying the supply function
bidding scheme will lead to system efficiency irrespec-
tive of whether the market is perfectly competitive or
oligopolistic.
Can the Efficiency Loss be Unbounded? - We show with
an example that the efficiency loss in the worst case can be
unbounded. Consider the case where there are three DHs with




where c and r are constant parameters. Using Theorem 2,
we can calculate the PCE to be: q̄1 = rr+2d , q̄2 = q̄3 =
1
r+2d ,




















1. Now let r →∞ - for the PCE we then
have q̄1 → d , q̄2, q̄3 → 0, p̄ → cd , and total cost C̄ → 0.


















Message for Regulators - We see that in a market with
DHs having extremely heterogeneous cost functions, the effi-
ciency loss at the ONE might be unbounded. Combining
this fact with the implications of Corollary 3, regulators are
advised to enable privacy trading by apps in segregated pools,
with similar data types to be traded.
B. OPTIMALITY OF OUR MECHANISM CHOICE
We prove the optimality of our mechanism choice, i.e., a lin-
ear supply function mechanism, over a class of mechanisms
that are suited to designing markets for our problem.
To embark on this task, we first consider a mechanism
desirable if it minimizes worst case efficiency loss when DHs
are ‘benefit anticipating’, independent of the utility functions
of the DHs and their number. That is, the mechanisms we
seek are those that perform well under broad assumptions
of the nature of the preferences of the market participants.
We will show that under a specific set of assumptions, our
mechanism choice minimizes the worst case efficiency loss
when compared to all other feasible mechanisms fitting the
assumptions. To this end, we first define the class, M,
of mechanisms that we want to consider.
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Definition 3: The class M of mechanisms consists of all
supply functions, M (b, p), such that the following conditions
are satisfied:
1) M defines a smooth market-clearing mechanism. Here,
a differentiable M : (0,∞)×R+→ R+ is said to be a
smooth market clearing mechanism if for all d > 0, for
all n = |N | > 1, and for all non-zero b = (b1, . . . , bN ),
∃ a unique solution p > 0 to
n∑
i
M (bi, p) = d . (10)
2) For all Ci ∈ C, for all u ∈ U , and for all d > 0,
a DH’s payoff is concave if it is benefit anticipating.
C is the set consisting of all continuous, convex, and
strictly increasing cost functions.
3) For all Ci ∈ C, for all u ∈ U , and for all d > 0, there
exists a b ≥ 0 such that M (bi, p) = qi(bi, p), ∀i.
The second condition allows us to characterize Nash equilib-
ria in terms of only the first-order conditions. To justify this
condition, we note that some assumption of quasiconcavity
is generally used to guarantee the existence of pure-strategy
Nash equilibria [50]. The third condition ensures that given
a benefit p and given qi(bi, p) ∈ [0, d], each DH i can
make a choice bi to guarantee qi(bi, p) - ensuring all possible
demands can be chosen any market-clearing benefit. In view
of these conditions, it is evident that the class of mechanisms
inM fit the privacy trading scenario we address in this work.
In this regard, we showcase the optimality of our proposed
parametric mechanism, an element of the set M, via the
following theorem, the proof of which is in the Section VIII.
Theorem 6: Given M ∈M, the following results hold:
1) There exists a competitive equilibrium b for any privacy
trading market characterized by the triplet (d,N ,U ),
where d is the total privacy compromise demand on the
ad-network side, N is the number of competing DHs,
and U is the vector of utility functions for every DH.
Moreover, for any such b, the resulting privacy com-
promises, qi(bi, p), for each DH i maximizes welfare.
2) There exists B : (0,∞) → (0,∞), a concave, strictly
increasing, differentiable, and invertible function, such
that for all p > 0, and bi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N, we have
M (bi, p) = biB(p).
3) The worst case market efficiency loss under oligopoly
is minimized if M (bi, p) = 1bip, for some 1 > 0.
Theorem Implication - For privacy trading oligopolymar-
kets, the linear supply functionmechanismminimizes the loss
in worst case market efficiency.
VI. COMPUTATIONAL EVALUATION
In this section, we focus on developing supply function bid-
ding algorithms that converge in practice to market equi-
libria for perfectly competitive and oligopolistic markets
in a distributed fashion. Our primary performance metric
is market equilibrium convergence speed in terms of the
number of iterations. Our motivation for coming up with
distributed algorithms is the fact that DH cost functions
are private information not released to an ad-network, and
as a result the latter cannot centrally solve the optimiza-
tion problems to maximize utilitarian social welfare and
arrive at ONE, respectively. In addition, we need algo-
rithms that are light on computation and communication
overhead.
A. MINI REAL-WORLD EVALUATION SETUP
As part of a mini-experiment to evaluate supply function
bidding algorithms, we collect sanitized consumer data for
1000 clients on their two sleep patterns (i.e., time to go to
sleep, hours of sleep) from three fitness app startup firms
A, B, and C based in northern California, USA. We ensure
that the set of 1000 clients for each company do not overlap.
For the aggregate data collected from both the companies,
we set up an independent (of A, B, and C) sleep expert
representative from a medical department at an university in
northern California to act as an ad-network. The expert has
thirty years of experience in research and consulting, and
more importantly possesses deep knowledge of what type
of sleep data would be of interest to different commercial
organizations in the fitness and pharmaceutical industries.
Having collected real-world data, as a mock experiment,
we synthetically implement a triopoly competition between
A, B, and C by choosing a senior representative from both
the firms to trade on the sanitized data of their clients with
the ad-network, i.e., the medical representative, in return for
(a) fictitious (but scaled on medical value of the data) mon-
etary benefits and (b) some health insights on the available
consumer data to be passed on by the representatives of A, B,
and C to their clients. We emphasize here that the ad-network
does not have knowledge of individual consumers whose data
is under trade. Trading is done using the supply function
mechanism and each of A, B, and C choose parameters of 1,
1, and 2 respectively, with a common demand upper limit
of 100 differential privacy (DP) units, and a zero lower limit.
Each DP unit is assumed to be 0.02. Each DH reports a nearly
linear cost function to be of the form Ci(qi) = aiqi + hiq2i
with ai ≥ 0 and hi  ai ≥ 0. More specifically, ai values
chosen by firms A, B, and C are 0.1, 0.2, and 0.1 respectively.
Correspondingly, the hi values chosen are 0.002, 0.005, and
0.005 respectively.
B. DISTRIBUTED BIDDING ALGORITHMS
As potential distributed algorithm candidate types, one
could either use the standard dual gradient algorithm pro-
posed in [51], or the alternative direction multiplier method
in [52]. Both types are iterative in nature, and equivalently
maps the supply bidding process. In this work15 we resort to
the dual gradient algorithm in [51], without loss of generality.
15We do not focus on the design of optimal distributed algorithms in
terms of speed and scalability. Our goal is to just show fast convergence
and scalability promise of implemented markets induced by supply function
theory, and our proposed algorithms achieve them using as basis, the seminal
algorithm type in [51].16
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FIGURE 3. (Benefit, Supply Function) at Market Equilibrium.
The basic idea behind the two algorithms (see Algorithms 1
and 2 for perfectly competitive and oligopolistic markets,
respectively) is the iterative interplay (until convergence)
between the ad-network announcing a benefit p to the DHs,
and the DHs subsequently updating their non-private bidding
functions bi to the ad-network. (see Figure 4 for a flowchart
representation) In principle, the crux lies behind convergence
lies in the Lagrangian of Equation (7) being strictly concave
and thereby using the Projection Theorem [55] we arrive at
the optimal benefit and supply functions at market equilib-
rium. Consequently, our proposed distributed bidding algo-
rithms possess all the convergence properties of dual gradient
algorithms. We refer the readers to [51] for details regarding
the theory of optimal step sizes, the stopping criterion, and
convergence speed. As an example of the high convergence
speed, we show via experiments in the following section that
for very low γ values in Algorithms 1 and 2, convergence
FIGURE 4. Flowchart of Distributed Market Bidding Algorithms.
is very fast, thereby showing great potential to ensure the
property of scalability for large number of DHs. To be more
specific, it is shown in [51] that in theory very small γ values
result in an exponential convergence rate.
C. SYNTHETIC EVALUATION SETUP
Due to a lack of real-world data, We experiment on syn-
thetic data, to further investigate the scalability, efficiency,
and convergence properties of our proposed algorithmic mar-
ket mechanisms. We consider two DH population settings
for our evaluations: (i) a privacy compromise setting with
30 DHs, and (ii) a significantly larger population setting with
300 DHs. For each DH i, we consider its cost function to
be of the form Ci(qi) = aiqi + hiq2i with ai ≥ 0 and
hi ≥ 0. The reason for choosing cost functions of such types
is their widespread use and popularity in economics (and also
somewhat evident from our experiment with the app firms)
due to (a) marginal costs can become either constant (when
hi = 0) or linear (when hi > 0) with the amount of
commodity in question, i.e., in our case the amount of privacy
compromise, and this is reflective of practical microeconomic
commodity settings (b) provides a very good approximation
to higher order cost functions, if they were to exist. As a
representative example (without loss of generality), for the
30 DH and 300 DH case respectively, the value of d is chosen
to be 15 units (indicative of a low aggregate compromise)
and 150 units (indicative of a high aggregate compromise)
of a normalized information-theoretic privacy leakage met-
ric17 [10] we define to be MI (Xi;Yi)H (Xi) , where Xi is the source
distribution18 at the DH i and Yi is the distribution at the
ad-network of Xi, and H (Xi) is the Shannon (information-
theoretic) entropy ofXi, andMI (Xi;Yi) is themutual informa-
tion between Xi and Yi. Note that 0 ≤
MI (Xi;Yi)
H (Xi)
≤ 1. ai and hi
are randomly drawnwithout loss of generality from [1, 2] and
[0, 4.5] respectively. We emphasize here that the constants
chosen for our work is with the mindset that we can have DH
cost functions taking low values and otherwise. Scaling up
or down the constant range would not affect results as long as
we have cost functions taking required value ranges. To study
the impact of the DH cost functions on the efficiency loss in
the ONE, we consider three cases: (i) DHs are homogeneous
(ai and hi equals 1 and 2 respectively for all DH i), (ii) one
DH has an extremely low cost function, and the other DHs
have the same cost function, and (iii) twoDHs have extremely
low cost functions, and the other DHs have the same cost
functions. For the low cost cases, we assume coefficients ai
and hi to be 0.1 and 0.2 respectively for low cost DHs, while
17Our methodology is general and independent of the
information-theoretic privacy metric. Differential Privacy is an example
of an information-theoretic metric. In addition, one of the reasons for
experimenting with a privacy metric different from that of differential
privacy as in the real world case, is to test for consistence of results with
different information-theoretic metrics.
18Consumer information collected by DHs can be represented as discrete
or continuous random variables.
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FIGURE 5. Comparison of Market Properties with Linear Marginal DH Cost (Based on Synthetic Data).
others have their ai and hi coefficients set high and randomly
selected in the interval [1, 2].
D. EVALUATION RESULTS
For our real-world experimental setting, we show
in Figure 3 the results for benefit and supply function values
at market equilibrium with respect to the number of iterations
to market convergence. We observe that benefit and supply
functions converge fast (within 25 iterations on a latest
MacBook Pro with 16GB RAM) to the market equilibrium
(ONE). This indicates the possibility of the existence of
workingmarkets satisfying all concerned stakeholders (as per
our model) if personal data were to be traded.As part of future
plans, we would like to run larger scale field experiments,
conditioned on the availability of real data, to validate our
speed and scalability claims on working privacy trading mar-
kets. However, in the absence of real-world data, we experi-
ment with synthetic data as curated in Section VI.C. Without
loss of generality (and in the interest of space), we represent
one of the 50 random instances in our plots. We not later on
the rationale of not showing confidence interval bars in the
plots.
For purely synthetic settings, we observe from Figure 5b
(where γ = 0.1, and DH marginal costs are linear) that
benefit and supply functions in the 30 DH case converge
fast (within 60 iterations on a latest MacBook Pro with
16GB RAM) to the market equilibrium (ONE). In addition,
the benefit at ONE is higher than that in PCE - consistent with
Theorem 5. Compared to the bi value at PCE, DHs with low
bids at the PCE tend to bid higher at the ONE, whereas DHs
who have high bids at the PCE tend to bid a low value at ONE.
The rationale here is that if a DH bids a low value at PCE,
it has an incentive to bid higher at ONE because the benefit at
ONE is higher and the DH might gain more. On the contrary,
if a DH bids high at PCE, it may have an incentive to decrease
bid at PCE because it might gain more by reducing privacy
compromise amount but collecting the same benefit due to
higher benefit at ONE. Through Figures 5c and 5d (where
γ = 0.05), we show the scalability of Algorithms 1 and 2.
The results and rationale are similar to those in Figure 5b,
and convergence to market equilibrium is equally fast.
Figure 5e plots the comparison of benefit and total cost
respectively at PCE and ONE. Figure 5f plots the amount
of privacy compromise by low and high compromise cost
users (denoting trade of low and high privacy sensitive data)
respectively, at PCE and ONE. We observe form Figure 5e
that if all DHs are homogeneous (i.e., trade data of similar
privacy sensitivity), the differences between the market equi-
librium benefits are small and the utilitarian social welfare
of the two market equilibria are the same - consistent with
Corollary 3. In all the three cases related to studying DH
cost impact on efficiency loss mentioned in Section VI.C,
146018 VOLUME 8, 2020
R. Pal et al.: Preference-Based Privacy Markets
Algorithm 1 Distributed Bidding Algorithm - Perfectly
Competitive Setting
1: On receiving benefit p(k) announced by the ad-network,








and submits it to the ad-network. Here ‘‘+’’ denotes the
projection ontoR+, the set of non-negative real numbers.
2: On gathering bids bi(k) from DHs, the ad-network
updates the benefit according to








and announces the benefit p(k + 1) to the DHs, where
r > 0 is a constant stepsize.
3: Set k → k + 1
4: Check stopping criterion as mentioned in [51], and repeat
we observe from Figure 5f that the differences in efficiency
loss betweenmarket equilibria decrease quickly with increase
in the number of DHs. This is due to the fact that with
increase in market size (multiple traders selling similar data),
the market power of each DH decreases and oligopoly tends
towards behaving like a perfectly competitive market. When
the market size is small, the differences in loss between
the two market equilibria (PCE and ONE) are large when
only one DH has a low cost function - this is because the
latter has market power (to attract customers who care for
privacy). However, when two DHs have low cost functions
the difference between the two market equilibria decreases
rapidly, implying the fact that the ad-network or a regulator
needs to introduce trading tiers of similar cost competingDHs
in the market to improve social welfare.When the market size
is large, the differences between the two market equilibria
are small for all the three efficiency loss study cases cited
in Section VI.C. However, as an interesting observation, for
the case when two DHs have low cost functions, the benefit
and cost ratio between two market equilibria is larger than
in the case when only one DH has a low cost function. This
is because all high cost DHs together contribute to a large
fraction of the total privacy compromise amount, which limits
themarket power of the low cost DH. Thus, given a fixed large
market size, low cost DHs in the two low-cost DH case will
have a larger market power than the low cost DH in a single
low-cost DH case, leading to a larger benefit and cost ratio.
DHs facing low trading cost compromise less on privacy at
ONE than in PCE, whereas DHs with high cost compromise
more at ONE than in PCE. This is because at ONE, DHs
havemarket power to increase the benefit. Low cost DHs gain
more net revenue by decreasing their compromise amount,
whereas high cost DHs have an incentive to compromise
more privacy due to increased benefit.
The results for the case when DH marginal costs are con-
stant is very similar and is shown through Figure 6b-6f. For
such plots the ai values are kept the same as in the case of lin-
ear marginal DH costs, and the hi values are equal to zero. The
reasoning behind the figures is the same as for Figure 5b-5f.
It is important to note that due to similarity of results for
the instances, and the convergence (as visible through the
plots), we do not need to show confidence intervals for the
plots.
Algorithm 2 Distributed Bidding Algorithm - Oligopolistic
Setting
1: On receiving benefit p(k) announced by the ad-network,








and submits it to the ad-network. Here ‘‘+’’ denotes the
projection ontoR+, the set of non-negative real numbers.
2: On gathering bids bi(k) from DHs, the ad-network
updates the benefit according to








and announces the benefit p(k + 1) to the DHs, where
r > 0 is a constant stepsize.
3: Set k → k + 1
4: Check stopping criterion as mentioned in [51], and repeat
VII. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a introductory but rigorous
preference-based privacy trading market model for mobile
in-app ecosystems of the current data surveillance age that
aims to achieve a maximum privacy welfare state amongst
competing data holders (e.g., apps) by preserving their
heterogeneous privacy preservation constraints upto certain
compromise levels (in return for benefits to data holders),
induced by their clients, and at the same time satisfying
requirements of agencies (e.g., advertisers) that collect client
data for the purpose of targeted advertising. More impor-
tantly, our proposed trading methodology is consensual in
the sense that pre-trading, DHs can decide on their trading
preferences as a function of the benefit to be offered, with-
out needing to sell non-voluntarily with no explicitly offered
benefit. To this end, using concepts from supply-function
economics, we proposed the first mathematically rigorous
privacy market design paradigm with private DH cost func-
tions that characterized states of market efficiency as well as
inefficiency by respecting heterogeneous privacy constraints
of competing data holders to extents possible, in a provably
optimal fashion. More specifically, we analyzed perfectly
competitive and oligopolistic markets to achieve market equi-
libria that is efficient in the former, but not in the latter
VOLUME 8, 2020 146019
R. Pal et al.: Preference-Based Privacy Markets
due to negative externalities of trading not being internal-
ized. Consequently, we characterized the efficiency gap in
closed form. As a major finding, we showed that increasing
competition between app firms of similar market power for
privacy trading activities contribute to increased economic
social welfare due to trading externalities being internalized
better between similar firm types, thereby suggesting regula-
tors to enable privacy trading in segregated pools of similar
app firms.
As part of future work, we plan to (a) gauge the
preference supply functions of individual DHs using
large-scale social experiments, and (b) investigate the
existence of efficient/boundedly inefficient multi-supplier
(apps), multi-demand side (ad-exchanges) market compe-
tition models in a privacy trade setting, and explicitly
account for information correlations between supplier side
data.
VIII. PROOFS OF THEOREMS
Proof of Theorem 1: Definition 1 tells that {(b̄i)i∈N , p̄} is a
competitive equilibrium if and only if
(C ′i (qi(b̄i, p̄i))− p̄)(bi − b̄i) ≥ 0, ∀bi ≥ 0 (15a)∑
i
qi(b̄i, p̄) = d (15b)
Here, (15a) results from the optimality condition of
the convex optimization problem of DH net revenue,
and (15b) follows directly from Definition 1. Since p̄ ≥ 0,
multiplying p̄ to (15a), we get
(C ′i (q̄i)− p̄) (qi − q̄i) ≥ 0, ∀qi ≥ 0 (16a)∑
i
q̄i = d (16b)
This is just the KKT optimality condition of the optimiza-
tion problem in the theorem. Hence, (qi)i∈N maximizes social








, p̄} satisfies (15a); this
tells that {(b̄i)i∈N , p̄} is a competitive equilibrium. If Ci(qi)
is convex for each DH i, then the social welfare maximiza-
tion problem is a strictly convex problem. Thus there exists
a unique optimal solution (q̄i)i∈N . Moreover, from (16a),
p̄ = C ′i (q̄i) for any q̄i ≥ 0 ⇒ p̄ is unique ⇒ unique
equilibrium. 
Proof of Theorem 2: From the proof of Theorem 1,
we know that {p̄, (q̄i)i∈N } satisfies (16a) and (16b).
From (16a), we know that, for any i ∈ N , 1) if q̄i > 0, then
p̄ = C ′i (q̄i) ≥ C
′
i (0), 2) if q̄i = 0, then p̄ ≤ C
′
i (q̄i) = C
′
i (0).
Thus, we know all the DHs who compromise on privacy have
a smaller C∗i = C
′
i (0) than those who do not. Since C
∗
i is
increasing in i, N̄ takes the form of 1, 2, . . . , n̄. If n̄ < |N |,
then 1 and 2 imply that C0n̄ ≤ p̄ ≤ C
0
n̄+1. If n̄ = |N |,
p̄ = C ′
|N |(q̄|N |) ≤ C
′




n̄ ≤ p̄ ≤

































Proof of Corollary 1: From Theorem 2, we know that
∀i ∈ N̄ , p̄ = C ′i (q̄i). Notice that Ci(·) is a convex function.
Thus Ci(q̄i) − Ci(0) ≤ C ′i (q̄i)q̄i. As Ci(0) = 0, we have
Ci(q̄i) ≤ p̄q̄i. 
Proof of Lemma 1: We prove the result by contradiction.





j = 0 for DHi. Then the payoff for
the DHi is Ui(b∗i , b
∗
−i) = 0 if b
∗







− Ci(d) if b∗i > 0. We see that when b
∗
i = 0, DHi has
an incentive to increase it, and when b∗i ≥ 0, DHi has an
incentive to decrease it. So, there is no Nash equilibrium with∑
j6=i b
∗
j = 0. 
Proof of Lemma 3:We have







































The first form in the square bracket in (18) is no greater
than 1 and strictly decreasing in bi, the second term is increas-
ing in bi. So, if
B−i
dC ′i (0)
≥ 1 and ∂Ui(bi,b−i)
∂bi
≤ 0 ∀bi, and






= 0 only at one point bi > 0.
Furthermore, note that ∂Ui(0,b−i)
∂bi
> 0 and ∂Ui(B−i,b−i)
∂bi
≤ 0.
So, the point bi maximizes DHi′s payoff Ui(bi, b−i) for a
given b−i. Thus, at Nash equilibrium, b∗,
b∗satisfies
































from lemma 1 and, 2) otherwise, b∗i satisfies (19). Note that
the second term on the left hand side of (19) is positive.











each DH will compromise a privacy of less than d2 at the
equilibrium. 
Proof of Theorem 3: Here, we prove the existence and
uniqueness of the optimal solution of optimization problem
in Theorem 3. We first pick d̂ < d2 such that |N | · d̂ > d
and solve this problem: min0≤qi<d̂
∑
iDi(qi) subject to
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FIGURE 6. Comparison of Market Properties with Constant Marginal DH Cost (Based on Synthetic Data).
∑











Such εi always exists because Di(qi) is a strictly increasing
function and limqi→ d2
Di(qi) = ∞. Therefore, we confer
that the optimization problem in Theorem 3 is equivalent to
this problem: min0≤qi≤ d2−εi
∑
i Di(qi) subject to
∑
i qi = d ,
which has a unique solution. Therefore, the optimal solution
always exists and the uniqueness follows from strict convex-
ity of Di(qi).







C ′i (qi) (20)
which is positive, strictly increasing function in qi ∈[
0, d2
)














1+ xid − 2xi
)

















dxi. Thus, limqi→ d2
Di(qi) =
∞. Therefore, the optimization problem in the theorem is
strictly convex problem and has unique optimal solution, and
after a bit of mathematical manipulation, we get the unique
















q∗i = d (21b)






























and the corresponding Nash equilib-
rium allocation q∗i = b
∗
i p












≤ 0. Note that at the




i > 0 by lemma 1.
Thus the Nash equilibrium of the game satisfies (21a) - (21c),
and solves the optimization problem in the theorem. The
existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is a result
of the existence and uniqueness of the optimal solution of the
optimization problem. 
VOLUME 8, 2020 146021
R. Pal et al.: Preference-Based Privacy Markets
Proof of Theorem 4:Note thatD′i(qi) is a strictly increasing
function of qi and D′i(0) = C
′
i (0). The proof follows the same
argument as in Theorem 2. 
Proof of Corollary 3: From Theorem 4, we know that ∀i ∈
N̄ , p∗ = D′i(q
∗
i ). Notice thatDi(·) is a strictly convex function.






i . Because Di(0) = 0,
Di(q) > Ci(q), we have Ci(q∗i ) < p
∗q∗i . 
Proof of Theorem 5: Notice that D′i(qi) and C
′
i (qi) are







. For any i ∈ N , (D′i)
−1(p̄) ≤ C−1i (p̄).









2 ≤ . . . . . . . ≤ C
0
n , we have























−1(p∗) = d . Thus, p∗ ≤ p̄. Therefore, n̄ ≤ n∗,















n − 2M . If n
∗
= n, there
exists one DHj such that 0 < q∗j ≤
d
















On the other side, there exists at least one DHj such that
C ′j (q̄i) = p̄ and q̄i ≥
d
n . Thus,






Combing (22) and (23) gives p∗ ≤ n−1n−2
M
m p̄. Lastly, C̄ ≤
C∗ comes from the fact that (q̄i)i∈N is an optimal solution
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Proof of Theorem 6: The proof of this theorem is dealt in
various steps, the first step recognizing that proof directly
follows from Theorem 1 in [56] due to the similarity in
structure.
Steps 2 of Proof of Theorem 6: A user’s payoff is con-
cave if he is price taking. The condition that a uniform
market-clearing price must exist implies that for any fixed
θ > 0, the range of D(µ, θ) must contain (0,∞) as µ varies
in (0,∞). Now suppose that for fixed θ > 0, there exist
µ1, µ2 > 0 with µ1 6= µ2 such that D(µ1, θ) = D(µ2, θ) =
d , where d > 0. Let C = 2d and let R = 2. Then for
θ = (θ, θ), there cannot exist a unique market-clearing price
pD(θ ); so we conclude that D(·, θ) is monotonic, and strictly
monotonic in the region where it is nonzero.
Let I ⊂ (0,∞) be the set of θ > 0 such that D(µ, 0)
is monotonically nondecreasing in µ. From the preceding
paragraph, we conclude that if θ ∈ (0,∞)\I , then D(µ, θ)
is necessarily monotonically nonincreasing in µ. Further,
if θ ∈ I , then D(µ, θ) → ∞ as µ → ∞, and D(µ, θ) → 0
as µ → 0; on the other hand, if θ ∈ (0,∞)\I , then
D(µ, θ)→ 0 as µ→∞, and D(µ, θ)→∞ as µ→ 0.
Suppose I 6= (0,∞) and I 6= ∅; then choose θ ∈ ∂I ,
the boundary of I . Choose a sequence θn ∈ I such that θn→
θ ; and choose another sequence θ̂n ∈ (0,∞)\I such that
θ̂n→ θ . Fix µ1, µ2 with 0 < µ1 < µ2, such thatD(µ1, θ) >
0 and D(µ2, θ) > 0. Then we have D(µ1, θn) ≤ D(µ2, θn),
and D(µ1, θ̂n) ≥ D(µ2, θ̂n). Taking limits as n→∞, we get
D(µ1, θ) ≤ D(µ2, θ), and D(µ1, θ) ≥ D(µ2, θ), so that
D(µ1, θ) = D(µ2, θ). But this is not possible, since D(·, θ)
must be strictly monotonic in the region where it is nonzero.
Thus I = (0,∞) or I = ∅.
We will use Step 1 to show D(µ, θ) is concave in θ ≥ 0
for fixed µ > 0. Since D(µ, θ) is continuous, it suffices to
show that D(µ, θ) is concave for θ > 0. Suppose not; fix
θ > 0, θ > 0, and δ ∈ (0, 1) such that:
D(µ, δθ + (1− δ)θ) < δD(µ, θ)+ (1− δ)D(µ, θ )
(EC.1)
Note this implies in particular that either D(µ, θ) > 0
or D(µ, θ ) > 0. We assume without loss of generality
that D(µ, θ) > 0. Let CR = RD(µ, θ), and let θ R =
(θ, · · · , θ) ∈ (R+)R. To emphasize the dependence of the
market-clearing price on the capacity, we will let pD(θ ;C)
denote the market-clearing price when the composite strategy
vector is θ and the capacity is C. We will show that for
any θ ′ > 0, if µR = pD(θ R−1, θ ′;CR), then µR → µ as
R → ∞. First note that by definition, we have D(µR, θ ′) +









D(µR, θ) = D(µ, θ) (EC.2)
Now note that as R → ∞, the right hand side remains
constant. Suppose that µR→∞. Since I = (0,∞) or I = ∅,
either D(µR, θ ′),D(µR, θ) → 0, or D(µR, θ ′),D(µR, θ) →
∞; in either case, the equality (EC.2) is violated for large R.
A similar conclusion holds if µR → 0 as R → ∞. Thus
we do not have µR → 0 or µR → ∞as R → ∞.
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Choose a convergent subsequence, such that µRk → µ̂, where
µ̂ ∈ (0,∞). From (EC.2), we mush haveD(µ̂, θ) = D(µ, θ).
But as established above, sinceD(·, θ) is strictly monotonic in
the region where it is nonzero, this is only possible if µ̂ = µ.
We conclude that the following three limits hold:
lim
R→∞
pD(θ R;CR) = µ;
lim
R→∞
pD(θ R−1, θ;CR) = µ;
lim
R→∞
pD(θ R−1, δθ + (1− δ)θ );CR) = µ; .
The remainder of the proof is straightforward. From
(EC.1), for R sufficiently large, we must have:
D(pD(θ R−1, δθ + (1− δ)θ );CR), δθ + (1− δ)θ )
< δD(pD(θ R;CR), θ)+ (1− δ)D(pD(θ R−1, θ;CR), θ).
This violates the conclusion of Step 1, so we conclude
D(µ, θ) is concave in θ ≥ 0 give µ > 0. A similar argu-
ment shows that µD(µ, θ) is convex in θ , by using the fact
that pD(θ )D(pD(θ ), θr ) must be convex in θr for nonzero θ .
Combining these results yields the desired conclusion.
Step 5, Proof of Theorem 6: B is an invertible, differen-
tiable, strictly increasing, and concave function on (0,∞).






We immediately see that B must be invertible on (0,∞); it
is clearly onto, as the right hand side of (EC.3) can take any
value in (0,∞). Furthermore, if B(p1) = B(p2) = γ for some
prices p1, p2 > 0, then choosing θ such that
∑R
r=1 θr/C = γ ,
we find that pD(θ ) is not uniquely defined. Thus B is one-to-
one as well, and hence invertible. Finally, note that since D
is differentiable, B must be differentiable as well. We let 8
denote the differentiable inverse of B. We will show that8 is
strictly increasing and convex.We first note that for nonzeroθ
we have:


















By Step 1, wr (θ ) is convex in θr > 0. By considering strategy
vectors θ for which θ−r = 0, it follows that 8 is convex.
It remains to be shown that8 is strictly increasing. Since8
is invertible, it must bemonotonic; and thus8 is either strictly
increasing or strictly decreasing. To simplify the argument,
we assume that 8 is twice differentiable. We twice differ-
encetiate wr (θ ), given in (EC.4). Letting µ =
∑R
s=1 θs/C ,













Consider some nonzero θ−r , and take the limit as θr → 0.
The limit of the left-hand side in (EC.5) is nonnegative, by the
convexity of wr (θ ) in θr > 0. The limit of the first term
in the right-hand side of (EC.5) is zero. Since 8(µ) > 0,
it follows that 8′(µ) > 0, so that 8 is strictly increasing.
This establishes the desired facts regarding B.
Steps 6, Proof of Theorem 6: Let (C,R,U) be a utility system.
A vector θ ≥ 0 is a Nash equilibrium if and only if at least
two components of θ are nonzero, and there exists a nonzero
vector d ≥ 0 and a scalar µ > 0 such that θr = µdr for all
r,
∑R
r=1 dr = C, and the following conditions hold:

















, if dr > 0;
U ′r (0) ≤ 8(µ), if dr = 0.
In this case dr = D(pD(θ ), θr )), µ =
∑R
r=1 θr/C, and
8(µ) = pD(θ ). Suppose that θ is a Nash equilibrium. Since
Qr (θr ;θ−r ) = −∞ if θ = 0, (from (7)), wemust have θ 6= 0.
Suppose then that only one component of θ is nonzero; say







But now observe that by infinitesimally reducing θr , user r
can strictly improve his payoff (since8 is strictly increasing).
Thus θ could not have been a Nash equilibrium; we conclude
that at least two components of θ are nonzero. In this case,
from (7), and the expressions in (11) and (EC.4), the payoff
Qr (θ r ;θ−r ) to user r is differentiable.When two components
of θ are nonzero, we may write the payoff Qr to user r as
follows, using (11) and (EC.4):
















Differentiating the previous expression with respect to θr ,
we conclude that if θ is a Nash equilibrium then the following
optimality conditions hold for each r :
Fr (θ ) = 0if θr > 0; (EC.6)
Fr (θ ) ≤ 0if θr = 0, (24)
where
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These conditions are equivalent to (14)-(15), if we make
the substitutions µ =
∑R
s=1 θs/C , and dr = D(pD(θ ), θr ).
Furthermore, in this case we have d ≥ 0, µ > 0, θr =
µdr ,
∑R
r=1 dr = C , and pD(θ ) = 8(µ).
On the other hand, suppose that we have found θ, d and µ
such that the conditions of Step 6 are satisfied. In this case
we simply reverse the argument above; since Qr (θ r ;θ−r ) is
concave in θr (Condition 2 in Definition 4), if at least two
components of θ are nonzero then the conditions (EC.6)-(24)
are necessary and sufficient for θ to be a Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, if d ≥ 0, µ > 0, θr = µdr , and
∑R
r=1 dr = C ,
then it follows that µ =
∑R
s=1 θs/C , 8(µ) = pD(θ ), and
dr = D(pD(θ ), θr ). Thus the conditions (EC.6)-(24) become
equivalent to (14)-(15), as required.
Steps 7, Proof of Theorem 6: Let (C,R,U) be a utility system.
Then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. Our approach
will be to demonstrate existence of a Nash equilibrium by
finding a solution µ > 0 and d ≥ 0 to (14)-(15), such that∑R
r=1 dr = C . If we find such a solution, then at least two
components of d must be nonzero; otherwise, (14) cannot
hole for the user r with dr = C . If we define θ = µd ,
then µ =
∑R
s=1 θs/C , so pD(θ ) = 8(µ); and from (11),
we have dr = D(pD(θ ), θr ). Thus if µ > 0 and d ≥ 0 satisfy
(14)-(15), then θ = µd is a Nash equilibrium by Steps 6.
Consequently, it suffices to find a solution µ > 0 and d ≥ 0
to (14)-(15).
We first show that for a fixed value of µ > 0, the equality
in (14) has at most one solution dr . To see this, rewrite (14)
as:













Since 8 is convex and strictly increasing with 8(µ)→ 0 as
µ→ 0, we have µ8′(µ)−8(µ) ≥ 0. Thus the left hand side
is strictly decreasing in dr (since Ur is strictly increasing and
concave), from U ′r (0) at dr = 0 to µ8
′(µ)−8(µ) ≤ 0 when
dr = C . This implies a unique solution dr ∈ [0,C] exists
for the equality in (14) as long as U ′r (0) ≥ 8(µ); we denote
this solution dr (µ). If 8(µ) > U ′r (0), then we let dr (µ) = 0.
Observe that as µ → 0, we must have dr (µ) → C , since
otherwise we can show that (14) fails to hold for sufficiently
small µ.
Next we show that dr (µ) is continuous. Since we defined
dr (µ) = 0 if 8(µ) > U ′r (0), and dr (µ) = 0 if 8(µ) = U
′
r (0)
from (14), it suffices to show that dr (µ) is continuous for µ
such that 8(µ) ≤ U ′r (0). But in this case continuity of dr
can be shown using (14), together with the fact that U ′r ,8
and 8′ are all continuous (the latter because 8 is concave
and differentiable, and hence continuously differentiable).
Indeed, suppose that µn → µ where 8(µ) ≤ U ′r (0), and
assume without loss of generality that dr (µn) → dr (since
dr (µn) takes values in the compact set [0,C]). Then since µn
and dr (µn) satisfy the equality in (14) for sufficiently large n,
by taking limits we see that µ and dr satisfy the equality
in (14) as well. Thus we must have dr = dr (µ), so we
conclude dr (µ) is continuous.
We now show that dr (µ) is nonincreasing in µ. To see
this, choose µ1, µ2 > 0 such that µ1 < µ2. Suppose that
dr (µ1) < dr (µ2). Then, in particular, dr (µ2) > 0, so (14)
holds with equality for dr (µ2) and µ2. Now note that as
we move from dr (µ2) to dr (µ1), the left hand side of (14)
strictly increases (since Ur is concave). On the other hand,
since 8 is convex and strictly increases with 8(µ) → 0
as µ → 0, we have the inequalities µ28′(µ2) − 8(µ2) ≥
µ18
′(µ1) − 8(µ1) ≥ 0. From this it follows that the right
hand side of (14) strictly decreases as we move from dr (µ2)
to dr (µ1) and from µ2 to µ1. Thus neither (14) nor (15) can
hold at dr (µ1) and µ1; so we conclude that for all r , we must
have dr (µ1) ≥ dr (µ2).
Thus for each r , dr (µ) is a nonincreasing continuous func-
tion such that dr (µ) → C as µ → 0, and dr (µ) → 0
as µ → ∞. We conclude there exists at least one µ > 0
such that
∑R
r=1 dr (µ) = C ; and in this case d (µ)
satisfies (14)-(15), so by the discussion at the beginning of
this step, we know that θ = µd (µ) is a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we show that the Nash equilibrium is unique.
Suppose that there exist two solutions d 1 ≥ 0, µ1 > 0, and




r = C for
i = 1, 2. Of course, we must have d i = d (µi), i = 1, 2.We
assume without loss of generality that µ1 ≤ µ2; our goal is
to show that µ1 = µ2. Since dr (·) is nonincreasing, we know




r = C for i = 1, 2,
we conclude that dr (µ1) = dr (µ2) for every r . Let r be such
that dr (µ1) = dr (µ2) > 0. Observe that 8(µ) and µ8′(µ)
are both strictly increasing in µ > 0, since 8 is strictly
increasing and convex. Thus for fixed dr > 0, the equality
in (14) has a unique solution µ, so dr (µ1) = dr (µ2) > 0
implies µ1 = µ2. Thus (14)-(15) have a unique solution
d ≥ 0, µ > 0, such that
∑R
r=1 dr = C . From Step 6, this
ensures the Nash equilibrium θ = µd is unique as well. Thus,
combining steps 1 to 7, we prove Theorem 6. 
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